Objective. Scholars continue to debate whether morally charged political issues constitute a distinct type of policy question or produce essentially the same political dynamic as public controversies lacking an overt moral dimension. The debate will not be resolved until scholars test the determinants of putative morality policies with predictors drawn both from morality politics theory and from the socioeconomic factors that account for the distribution of many other public policies. This study reports such a test. Methods. We analyze data from our national survey of directors of school-based health centers. We use ordinary least squares regression models to predict the level of reproductive health care services provided to adolescents. Results. Service levels were influenced not only by cultural considerations, as morality politics theory would anticipate, but also by the same socioeconomic forces that account for policy levels in other domains. Conclusions. Policy for morality issues appears different from that for nonmorality issues but less distinctive than commonly imagined.
As the United States experiences a cultural shift from materialist to postmaterialist values, economic conflicts are increasingly being displaced by those involving issues related to civil rights, environmental protection, abortion, drugs, sex, and alternative lifestyles (Minkenberg and Inglehart, 1990) . Variously called "culture wars" (Hunter, 1991) , "morality politics" (Meier, 1994) , or "social regulatory policy" (Tatalovich and Daynes, 1998) , this domain of public policy is thought to be distinctive because the issues engage the fundamental values and moral concerns of citizens. At base, the controversies grouped under morality politics involve conflicting versions of *Direct all correspondence to Kenneth Wald, Department of Political Science, University of Florida, POB 117325, Gainesville, FL 32611-7325 <kenwald@polisci.ufl.edu>. We are grateful to the Spencer Foundation for a grant that supported our project, "The Politics of Innovation in Education: School-Based Health Care." All responsibility for the analysis and interpretations rests with the authors. In addition, we wish to thank Seth McKee for assistance in data collection and the Social Science Quarterly reviewers for providing us with extraordinarily helpful comments and suggestions for revision. Data are available from the first author for purposes of replication. Wildavsky (1987:4) called our deepest desires:-"how we wish to live with other people and how we wish others to live with us."
Morality politics challenges the dominant political economy framework in public policy. From this venerable perspective, the major forces determining policy levels are the material interests of political actors and their constituencies (Dye, 1966; Peterson, 1981; Sharkansky, 1968) . For issues with primarily economic consequences, the approach has proven quite fruitful (see, e.g., Feiock and West, 1993; Clingermayer and Feiock, 1990; Santoro, 1995; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson, 1995) . But some researchers have suggested that the distinctive qualities of morality policies may produce "substantially different politics and adoption patterns from those of economically-based policies" (Mooney and Lee, 1995:600) . Although culture war disputes may implicate economic interests, their grounding in deep-seated moral values supposedly draws on different social forces than those that are engaged by conventional policy disputes (Gormley, 1986) .
Cultural conflicts also challenge the conventional understanding of urban politics. Battles over hate crimes, sexual assault policies, gay rights legislation, attacks on abortion clinics, health care for persons with HIV/AIDS, and zoning regulations for pornography have been fought out at the local level (Sharp, 1999) . The salience of these issues in urban politics challenges Peterson's (1981) long-accepted delineation of three policy arenas in local governance: developmental, allocational, and redistributional. Each of these arenas emphasizes policy concerns that affect a city's economic vitality, raising the salience of economic considerations. But in morality policy conflicts, it is hypothesized, "moral values rather than material resources are at stake" (Sharp, 1999:8) .
This study investigates the politics of providing reproductive health services to adolescents in school-based health medical clinics at the local level. Specifically, we attempt to determine whether the provision of such services better approximates the morality politics model or the political economy approach that has dominated scholarly research. Strange as it may seem, scholars have not done much to establish that morality politics warrants its reputation as an independent domain in the policy process but have largely been content to treat specific issues as morality questions by fiat (Smith, 2000) . Despite a proliferation of case studies, Smith (2000:1) concludes, "it is not clear that morality policies can be clearly distinguished from nonmorality policy" because empirical studies of what are deemed "morality issues" have not always included a full set of predictors appropriate to both morality and economic policies. We therefore use a research design that incorporates determinants associated with both the morality and nonmorality policy domains.
The article proceeds in several steps. In the next section, we discuss the development of school-based health centers (SBHCs) and the competing "issue frames" that have been used by their supporters and opponents. We next identify and operationalize the potential determinants of clinic services related to reproductive health, drawing on both morality politics research and the literature about nonmorality policies. After that, we describe the data set that provided the information about reproductive services in SBHCs and provide specific information about our dependent variables. The concluding sections present the results of our multivariate analysis of the determinants of service levels in the clinics and discuss the implications for public policy analysis.
Politics of School-Based Health Centers
SBHCs are a growing, innovative approach to providing basic medical services to underserved youth. Among their primary goals, these clinics address issues of reproductive health care, particularly high rates of teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). To reduce both epidemics, many SBHCs provide services ranging from sexuality education to access to birth control, including condoms, abortion counseling and referral, and testing and treatment for HIV and other STDs.
Despite determined efforts by advocates to "frame" these services in the language of public health, community debates over SBHCs have often been couched in the language of morality politics (Rienzo and Button, 1993; Emihovich and Herrington, 1997) . In many communities, opponents of such clinics have emphasized SBHCs' alleged endorsement of teen sexual activity by labeling them as "sex clinics" (Dryfoos, 1994) . For the most part, widespread opposition to SBHCs has come from conservative Christian groups and the Catholic Church. In the late 1980s the Archbishop of the Los Angeles Diocese issued a pastoral letter criticizing the decision to establish health centers in three Los Angeles high schools. He expressed particular concern about the moral issues posed by the availability of birth control to teenagers and by referrals of pregnant girls for abortion (Brodeurk, 1999) . Pro-lifers in California recently mobilized opposition to clinic expansion by claiming that a school health center "puts great pressure on young girls to become sexually active by offering contraceptives and abortion referrals while using a school campus setting to give promiscuity a false 'respectability'" (Missionaries to the Unborn, 2000) .
Despite the prevalence of such language, there are several reasons why SBHCs and reproductive health care may not fit well into the arena of morality politics. As Sharp (1996:12) has noted, "SBHC initiatives involve issues of financing, professional prerogative and redistributive politics that should make traditional economic and political considerations highly relevant." The redistributive component is especially important because SBHCs serve primarily poor, minority youths: 60% are African American or Latino and 67% are eligible for free or reduced school lunch plans (Fothergill, 1998) . As clinics are public health facilities targeted to low-income residents, the sexuality services they offer may better fit Peterson's (1981) category of economic redistributive politics. Moreover, school-based clinics may attempt to avoid cultural conflict by withholding the most controversial services dealing with sexuality, particularly birth control, emphasizing instead relatively consensual health care such as physicals/sports exams, primary care, immunizations, and mental health counseling. If SBHCs avoid controversy over moral issues, economic considerations may indeed play a more central role in the distribution of their services.
Determinants of Reproductive Health Services in School Clinics
Our central concern is whether the factors that predict levels of reproductive health services offered in SBHCs are primarily those associated with morality policy or those associated with policies that redistribute economic benefits. In studies of state-level public policies (Meier, 1994; Meier and McFarlane, 1992; Meier and Johnson, 1990; Mooney and Lee, 1995) and voter behavior in popular referendums, "the moral values of state citizens," as indexed by measures of religious affiliation and public opinion, have played the largest role in predicting the adoption of policies with moral implications (Mooney, 1999:677) . Correspondingly, research on morality policy adoption suggests a much lesser role for socioeconomic factors and broad political forces, the major determinants of policy adoption in other domains. Indeed, some studies of putative morality policies omit these factors altogether.
Using Mooney and Lee's (1995) useful framework, we organize potential predictors in three general categories. First, there are factors that influence demand for a policy. The second set of factors encompasses the resources available to the advocates of a policy. The final category, restraints, identifies the forces that may inhibit the adoption of new policies. Each set of determinants must be included to encompass the full range of forces that operate in policymaking. We must also distinguish between those forces that are commonly invoked to explain the distribution of economic policies and the distinctive determinants of morality policy. Table A1 in the Appendix lists all the independent variables involved and their sources.
In studies of economic policies, demand is usually defined by the socioeconomic condition of the community and its citizens (Dye, 1966; Hwang and Gray, 1991) . The demand in a particular community for redistribution of economic benefits is generally an inverse function of the economic status of the citizens of that community. For our purposes, we will use city population size (urbanization), poverty rate, and African American and Hispanic population proportions as indicators of economic demand. 1 The demand for innovative moral policies usually originates with progressive elites who are dissatisfied with existing conditions. In the case of SBHCs, we regard the strength of the local Planned Parenthood organization as the best proxy for elite advocacy on behalf of reproductive health care for adolescents. We will include both the raw and per capita number of Planned Parenthood units in the city where the clinic is located.
If the distribution of reproductive services in SBHCs is principally driven by economic considerations, the critical resource available to advocates is likely to be the political representation of interested elites, in this case African Americans and Hispanics. Reflecting the growth and mobilization of racial and ethnic groups in American cities, elected minority representatives have been an important determinant of city and school policies in other domains (Karnig and Welch, 1980; Meier and Stewart, 1991) . Given the principal population served by clinics, the level of minority group representation is expected to enhance the availability of reproductive services in SBHCs. Relying on data provided by the relevant interest groups, we use the per capita number of African American and Hispanic school board members in the city where each clinic is located. If we understand SBHCs primarily in terms of morality politics, what are the critical resources likely to enhance the availability of reproductive health services? Previous research suggests that clinics often draw upon the expertise and resources of statewide lobbying organizations (Sharp, 1996) . We will operationalize this with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the clinic is located in a state with such an association.
The potential constraints on reproductive services in SBHCs involve the political and moral "climates of opinion." For policies with economic implications, it has been customary to include measures of the general political climate of the community. Research on many policy issues has found that adoption of innovative policies is more common in environments where public officials favor the use of government to address social problems (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993) . Unfortunately, although previous studies have been able to draw upon a rich set of measures of statewide political climate, there is no comparable data available for localities. The best surrogate measure, despite its obvious shortcomings, is the share of the presidential vote earned by Democratic candidates. For this analysis, we thus obtained the percentage of the 1996 presidential vote that went to the Democratic candidate, Bill Clinton, in the county where each clinic was located.
Innovative morality policies are likely to be constrained by both cultural values and government structure (Sharp, 1999) . Previous research has identified conservative/traditionalist religious adherents as the major opponents of policies that challenge social traditionalism (Mooney and Lee, 1995) . For these groups, such innovations are perceived as direct attacks on basic values and a way of life (Gusfield, 1963) . Although they are found everywhere, moral traditionalists are most heavily concentrated in the Southern region.
To get at cultural traditionalism, we created a composite variable. Using county-level data on religious adherence collected in 1990, we calculated the number of adherents of evangelical/fundamentalist Christian denominations as a percentage of both the total number of religious adherents and the total population of the county where each clinic was located. 2 A dummy variable representing the clinic's location in a Southern state was also included. These three items formed a reliable measure (alpha = 0.91). The structure of the political system may also impose constraints on the types and levels of service provided by clinics. Elected rather than appointed public officials are especially susceptible to the demands of activated opponents (and proponents) of highly controversial morality issues (Gormley, 1986) . If conflict over SBHCs is primarily cultural in nature, we anticipate that elected school boards will depress the level of sexually related medical services. The equations will include a dummy variable coded 1 if the district where the clinic is located elects rather than appoints members of the school board.
The Nature of Reproductive Services
Data on reproductive services in SBHCs were obtained from a mail survey of a random sample of the 1,053 SBHCs listed in the Advocates for Youth national clinic census for 1998 (Fothergill, 1998) . Using Dillman's (1978) "total design method" we mailed out surveys in October 1998 and followed up with two additional mailings to nonrespondents. Over the next several months, we telephoned nonrespondents, urging them to complete the survey. Of our initial sample of 350 clinics, 44 were subsequently identified as closed or not an SBHC. Of the remaining 306 clinics, the directors of 226 responded, for a 74% response rate. The high overall response rate and the lack of sample bias on the regional parameter strongly suggests that these are a representative group of clinics. For this study, we investigated only the 175 SBHCs that offered services within middle and/or high schools, since clinics serving elementary school children rarely provide any sexuality or reproductive health care. Table 1 reports the overall service profiles for the 175 clinics in the subsample. To measure the availability of sexually related services, we began with an exploratory factor analysis of the 21 health services mentioned on the questionnaire. Each item was dichotomized so that clinics offering the service received a value of 1. (These items are listed in Table 1 in descending order of availability.) Most of the variance was explained by two factors based on 12 items related to reproductive health. We ran reliability analyses on two composite scales suggested by the factor analysis. The first compos- 
a Included in the sexual health services scale.
b Included in the contraceptive services scale.
ite scale (alpha = 0.82) included an array of services associated with sexual health:-gynecological exams, pregnancy testing, STD diagnosis and treatment, HIV/AIDS testing, and sexual identity counseling. We will refer to this scale as sexual health care. The items on the second scale, birth control counsel/referring, contraceptive devices, and abortion counseling/referral, were more tightly linked to contraception. Accordingly, we refer to this second scale (alpha = 0.81) as contraceptive services. Although the two scales were positively correlated, with about 25% of the variance in common, we resisted the temptation to merge them. Using two separate dependent variables will help us understand if services specifically related to contraception produce a different pattern of politics from those services linked more generally to sexual health. 3
Results Table 2 provides the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis for the two dependent variables-sexual health services and contraceptive services. Although our initial selection of independent variables minimized multicollinearity within the demand, resource, and constraint categories, there were problems of high interrelation across the three categories. Rather than suffer unstable coefficients, we reduced the set of predictors by eliminating variables with tolerances below .50. This admittedly arbitrary standard means that less than half the variance of any single predictor can be explained by the combined predictive power of the other independent variables in the equation. Two predictors were dropped under this standard, the Clinton vote (highly predicted by the socieconomic status (SES) measures) and the Hispanic population share. 4 Because of the small number of cases (n = 164 after removing cases with missing values), we will use the .05 significance test to identify important determinants. Given increasing dissatisfaction with this measure of significance (Gill, 1999) , we will also call attention to coefficients that are only slightly beyond that threshold. The table itself reports the actual significance level for each predictor in the equation.
The patterns in Table 2 suggest that although the two dependent variables do not share identical predictors, they tell a similar story. The major finding is that neither sexual health services nor reproductive care falls exclusively in the economic or morality politics domain. Rather, the coefficients suggest that the services offered by clinics are a function of both socioeconomic conditions and cultural norms.
Looking first at sexual health services, the morality politics overtones are clear. The level of such services was depressed in clinics located in the South and in counties with large proportions of white evangelical Protestants. These coefficients, plus the positive influence of having a state association to promote SBHCs, leave little doubt that that school clinics become relevant to politics in some degree because of their moral dimension. Yet there are some determinants suggesting that the provision of services related to sexual health also conforms to the redistributive politics of economic issues. The availability of these services in clinics was negatively influenced by the level of community poverty but responded positively both to the percentage of African Americans in the community and (though just below the .05 level of significance) to the electoral representation of African Americans and Hispanics in local government. This suggests that sexual health services are perceived as a tangible benefit by the minority community, whose elites work politically to ensure their availability. In that sense, the sexual health services provided by school clinics resemble the traditional economic policies that have been studied intensively in research on urban politics. What of health services more specifically oriented around contraception? Consistent with a morality politics perspective, the cultural values of the community exerted a strong impact. The availability of contraception through clinics was diminished by higher concentrations of evangelical Protestants and a Southern location. The other significant influence on contraceptive services, a positive effect associated with population size, can be interpreted to support both an economic and a morality politics interpretation. As noted earlier, population size is often regarded as a proxy of need for social services. From a public health perspective, the perspective that drives siting decisions, there is particular urgency in providing contraceptive care to students in large cities because of their high risk of teen pregnancy (Fothergill, 1998) . This is the same type of consideration given to the provision of other public services targeted to poor and/or minority children. Yet it is important to recognize that urban areas might also be more culturally comfortable with the idea of providing contraception to young people through school clinics. As Wilson (1995) has demonstrated, urbanism is associated with more tolerant attitudes about sexual behavior. Accordingly, urban areas probably provide a less contentious environment in which to distribute contraceptive information and devices to young people. So the positive relationship of contraceptive distribution to population size does not enable us to choose between the models of economic redistribution and morality politics.
Discussion
For many years, scholars have accepted on principle the notion that public policy issues that engage moral values constitute a distinct type of policy question, different in kind from economic policy issues. As such moral issues have become more central to the political agenda, particularly in urban areas, students of public policy have called for serious reexamination of the assumption. The best way to determine whether morality politics questions do indeed offer a fundamentally new type of public conflict, the traditional assumption, is through a comparative design that tests empirically for variables used to explain economic policies as well as the distinctive forces associated with morality politics.
As part of that ongoing reassessment of the morality politics model, this study adopted a comparative design to assess the determinants of policy adoption. The study, unique in the specific public service under review and the use of an urban rather than a state venue, suggests that morality politics has much in common with other policy types. Make no mistake about it: For both dependent variables, there was a clear morality politics dimension. The cultural climate, operationalized in terms of religious geography and region, had a strong influence on the provision of sexual health and contraceptive services. As expected, such services were less common in areas of cultural traditionalism. If that is what makes an issue part of the morality politics domain, then the provision of reproductive health care by SBHCs clearly fits the profile. Yet there was also compelling evidence that the provision of such services reflected the customary profile of many economic policies. In our national sample of SBHCs, sexual health services were distributed according to the socioeconomic and political makeup of the community. Contraceptive services also appear to have been distributed in ways that bore the imprint of needs assessment.
Our findings for reproductive health care in SBHCs suggest that cultural factors do not completely supplant other considerations but rather are supplemented by economic, political, and racial predictors. That is not altogether surprising, considering the debate over school clinics. For advo-cates, such clinics are a public health benefit addressed to specific medical needs. Because problems of teen sexuality, particularly pregnancy, are often thought to be of greater urgency in urban areas and among minority students, the distribution of services is influenced by the same predictors that affect other policies addressed to urban and minority problems (Meier and Stewart, 1991) . To their enemies, school clinics are places that undermine traditional moral values by facilitating-if not actually encouraging-sexual activity by teenagers. The opposition to clinics as providers of reproductive health care is strongest where cultural conservatism is predominant. That is the quality we expect from an issue framed in terms of morality politics.
A single case study is hardly sufficient to resolve the debate between scholars who assert the uniqueness of public controversies about moral issues and those who regard such issues as similar in fundamental respects to other types of policy questions. Apart from the inherent limitation of a single study, ours was restricted to the local level and focused on only one dimension of the policy process: the determinants of service levels. Notwithstanding these caveats, the findings suggest that the determinants of morality policies are different, but not entirely so, from those of more conventional economic issues. On the basis of such findings, scholars who utilize the morality politics framework should not omit predictors that have proven useful in the study of policies with economic implications.
